Modern Alternatives to Privileged Access Workstations (PAWs) for Cloud Administration

In traditional IT security models, highly privileged administrators often use Privileged Access Workstations (PAWs), dedicated, locked-down devices, to perform sensitive cloud administration tasks (like managing Azure or Microsoft 365). The logic is simple: keep high-risk admin activities separate from everyday computing to minimise exposure. This approach aligns with the “clean source principle,” which says any admin action should originate from a clean, trusted device free of malware . If an attacker compromises the device from which you administer critical cloud services, they can impersonate you or steal your tokens, defeating other security measures . The UK’s National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) also emphasises that a PAW’s primary goal is to “minimise the attack surface of the device used for high-risk access” and avoid exposing it to risky activities like email or general web browsing . In other words, a PAW is a highly trusted machine used exclusively for admin duties, making compromise much harder.

However, as organisations move to cloud-first, modern-managed environments (where every endpoint is corporate-owned, Intune-enrolled, and under strict policy), the classic PAW model can feel cumbersome. Carrying a second laptop for admin tasks or maintaining separate VMs can hinder usability and productivity. Are there modern alternatives that provide comparable security without the traditional PAW’s inconvenience? In this analysis, we explore emerging approaches, from zero-trust network controls and micro-segmentation to cloud-hosted virtual desktops, that aim to secure privileged access in an all-corporate device environment. We’ll compare these against the traditional PAW in terms of usability, attack surface reduction, adherence to the clean source principle, and alignment with best practices from NCSC and Microsoft. We’ll also examine how they integrate with Microsoft’s security stack (Conditional Access, Defender for Endpoint, Intune, Entra ID) to enforce device trust and session security.

The Traditional PAW Model and Its Challenges

A traditional PAW is typically a separate Windows device (e.g. a laptop) that an admin uses only for privileged tasks. It’s tightly managed: no personal email, no casual web surfing, application whitelisting turned on, admin rights removed for the workstation’s user, and only the needed management tools installed . Because it’s used only for administration, the risk of encountering malware (through phishing, drive-by downloads, etc.) is dramatically reduced. This isolation implements the clean source principle in a straightforward way, the device remains “clean” since it’s not used for day-to-day work that could expose it to threats.

Both Microsoft and NCSC advocate such separation for high-risk roles. NCSC explicitly describes a PAW as “a trusted physical user device designed to protect high-risk accesses…not directly exposed to high-risk functions” like email or untrusted websites . Microsoft’s guidance similarly outlines privileged workstations as part of a broader privileged access strategy, built on a foundation of a strongly secured device combined with robust identity and access controls .

While highly secure, the traditional PAW model comes with practical challenges. Admins must carry and maintain an extra device (or multiple devices if they manage different security domains). It’s not unheard of for a single administrator to juggle three or four laptops e.g. one for everyday work, one PAW for domain admin tasks, another for cloud admin, maybe even one for a segregated production environment. This is operationally cumbersome and costly. In today’s era of remote and hybrid work, issuing and managing dedicated hardware for every privileged user can be logistically difficult and expensive. More importantly, usability suffers: switching devices or accounts to perform tasks slows people down. If the PAW is too locked-down or inconvenient, admins might seek workarounds (like using their regular device “just this once”), defeating the purpose.

NCSC’s new guidance acknowledges this, stressing that a PAW solution “must also serve as an enabling technology,” giving admins the tools to do their job efficiently so they won’t resort to insecure alternatives. In short, security controls that frustrate users can backfire.

Given these drawbacks, organisations are exploring whether modern security tools, especially with all endpoints under management can provide “PAW-like” security without requiring a separate physical machine for every admin.

Two key avenues have emerged:

1. Zero Trust network access and micro-segmentation to tightly control admin sessions on regular endpoints

2. Cloud-hosted virtual workstations (like Windows 365 Cloud PC or Azure Virtual Desktop) that act as on-demand PAWs. 

Let’s examine each approach.

Zero Trust Enforcement and Micro-segmentation for Admin Access

One alternative to having a dedicated device is to enforce that only highly secure, policy-compliant conditions can even initiate a privileged session, essentially shrinking the attack surface through identity and network controls. In a fully managed device environment, every Windows endpoint is already enrolled in Microsoft Intune and monitored by Microsoft Defender for Endpoint, so we know the health and compliance state of each device. With Conditional Access (CA) policies in Entra ID, we can make sure that any login to cloud admin portals or PowerShell management interfaces requires a device that is domain-joined, Intune compliant, and perhaps even marked as a “trusted” device for admins . For example, an organisation might configure CA such that only devices in a specific device group (say, tagged as “PAW” or “AdminWorkstation”) are allowed to access Azure management endpoints. If an attacker steals an admin credential and tries to use it from an unknown device, they’d be blocked by this policy. CA can also demand MFA (preferably phishing-resistant, like FIDO2 keys) and even check device risk signals from Defender for Endpoint, ensuring the device isn’t flagged with active threats before allowing a session. This is very much in line with Zero Trust principles; “never trust, always verify” each access, considering user, device, and context.

Beyond identity enforcement, micro-segmentation can add another layer of defence. Micro-segmentation means carving up your network or cloud environment into small, isolated zones so that accounts and devices only see and reach what they absolutely need. In a privileged access scenario, this could mean that an admin’s workstation (even their regular corporate laptop) is technically capable of connecting only to management interfaces and nothing else. Tools like Zscaler’s Zero Trust Exchange or other software-defined perimeter solutions can enforce that an admin user accessing, say, the Azure portal or an RDP session to a server must go through a secured broker that verifies device posture and user identity. By doing so, even if an attacker somehow runs malware on an admin’s PC, that malware would have a very hard time reaching out to anything sensitive , the network paths simply aren’t there. Zscaler Private Access (ZPA), for instance, can restrict an admin’s connectivity such that they can only hit approved admin services (Azure management URLs, APIs, etc.) and nothing else on the internet or corporate network, effectively creating a logical “air gap” around privileged activities. This kind of Zero Trust Network Access (ZTNA) approach narrows an attacker’s opportunities: it “restricts line-of-sight visibility and access to applications, protecting against lateral movement” inside your environment.

The big advantage of the Zero Trust/micro-segmentation route is usability, the admin can use their primary corporate device (no second laptop needed) as long as they satisfy the strict security checks. It also leverages tools many organisations already use (Conditional Access, Intune, Defender, etc.), just configured in a more hardened way for admin accounts. Integration with the Microsoft security stack here is straightforward: for example, Intune can set the device compliance policies and hardening baselines, Defender for Endpoint provides real-time risk assessment, and Conditional Access ties it together by permitting admin logins only from devices that are Intune-managed, compliant, and healthy. If desired, additional third-party cloud security (like Zscaler) can supplement this by adding network-level assurances and monitoring.

However, we should consider the trade-offs. This approach still violates the purest form of the clean source principle, the device is not exclusively used for privileged access; it’s a dual-use machine that also handles email, web browsing, and daily work. No matter how compliant or up-to-date a PC is, the fact that it runs Outlook and a web browser all day means there’s an inherent risk. A single errant click on a phishing email could silently compromise the device, after which the attacker can patiently wait for the admin to perform privileged actions. From the cloud service’s perspective, all security conditions (correct user, MFA, compliant device) might be met, yet the session could be maliciously hijacked from within. In other words, if the endpoint is owned by an attacker, device compliance alone won’t save you, because the attacker is effectively operating from a “trusted” device. Micro-segmentation helps contain what an attacker can do (for example, malware on an admin PC might not be able to spread internally or call out to unauthorised services), but it doesn’t stop the malware from piggybacking on legitimate admin access that is allowed. For this reason, many security architects see a Zero Trust policy approach as a great complement to PAWs but not always a full replacement for a truly separate privileged environment, especially for the most sensitive “Tier-0” tasks. It raises the security baseline significantly and in organisations with only corporate-managed devices, it may even be deemed sufficient for certain admin roles, but it still carries more risk than a completely isolated workstation.

In practice, organisations might adopt a tiered model: for example, allow routine cloud admin tasks (Tier-1 admins) to be done from a well-managed standard laptop under strict Conditional Access policies (essentially treating that device as a “secure enterprise” workstation), but require more critical admin actions (like full directory or tenant admin – Tier-0) to be done from a separate environment. This is reflected in Microsoft’s guidance that outlines Enterprise, Specialised, and Privileged device profiles. An Enterprise profile device is quite locked down and good for general admins, but the full Privileged profile goes further (blocking all unapproved websites, etc.) and would typically be a distinct device. With modern solutions, that distinct environment might not need to be a physical PC – it could be virtual, which brings us to the next approach.

Cloud-Hosted Virtual PAWs: Windows 365 and Azure Virtual Desktop

Perhaps the most popular “modern alternative” to a physical PAW is leveraging a cloud-based virtual machine as your privileged workstation. Microsoft’s Windows 365 Cloud PC and Azure Virtual Desktop (AVD) are two services that let you run a Windows desktop in Azure. Instead of sitting under your desk, this admin workstation lives in Microsoft’s cloud and you remote into it from your regular device when you need to perform admin duties. Functionally, it can be treated just like a traditional PAW; you join it to Entra ID, enroll it in Intune, and apply all the hardened configurations and software restrictions that you would to a physical PAW. In fact, from an Intune/Defender perspective, a Cloud PC or AVD session host is just another corporate-managed endpoint so you can enforce the same “no email, no Office apps, no web except admin portals, no local admin rights, AppLocker enforced” policies on it. It essentially becomes a one-stop admin jump box, with all the security of a PAW but none of the physical baggage.

The beauty of this approach is that it maintains a separate environment for privileged work while drastically improving convenience for the user. You don’t need to carry a second laptop; you can connect to your Cloud PC/AVD from your normal work device (via Remote Desktop client or browser). For instance, instead of logging into a separate PAW laptop, an admin might launch the Remote Desktop app on their primary machine and open their “Privileged Cloud PC” a completely isolated desktop where they sign in with their admin account and do their work. According to practitioners, “you can still lock them down in similar ways [as physical PAWs]. The only difference really is one is another device you need to carry; the other you access via something like the Windows RD client”. This resonates with organisations that have globally distributed admins or external consultants, delivering a secure admin workstation as a cloud service means you can get a new PAW instance up and running in minutes (no procurement or shipping), and decommission it just as easily when no longer needed . It’s essentially PAW-as-a-Service.

Of course, simply spinning up a Cloud PC doesn’t automatically make it secure, you must still apply the rigorous policies and controls around it. The good news is that integration with Microsoft’s security stack is straightforward and powerful. You would enroll the Cloud PC/AVD in Intune, apply your hardened baseline (e.g. disable unnecessary services, block unapproved apps, enable BitLocker, etc.), and onboard it to Defender for Endpoint for continuous monitoring . Then, you’d use Conditional Access to ensure that only this virtual PAW can be used by the admin account to log into cloud portals. Entra ID’s device filters or extension attributes make this possible, for example, tag the Cloud PC’s Entra ID device object with “PAW” and create a CA policy that blocks any login to the Azure portal or admin center by privileged accounts, except from devices with that tag. This way, even if an admin accidentally tried to use their elevated account on their regular machine, they’d be denied by design. (The policy would apply to all privileged roles except your emergency break-glass account). Additionally, you can flip CA the other way around too: require that the Cloud PC itself only be accessible from authorised client devices. One engineer describes how they “configured a CA policy to only allow access to AVD for my privileged account from my primary device”. In practice, this could mean you only permit connections to the Cloud PC from known IPs or require the user’s endpoint to also be compliant. These layers ensure that the virtual PAW doesn’t become an open door, it’s fenced off for use only by the right person, on a managed device, under the right conditions.

When done right, a Cloud PC or AVD-based PAW can closely emulate the security of a physical PAW. Attack surface on the virtual workstation is kept minimal (since it’s locked down to admin tools only). The admin uses a separate privileged account inside that environment, preventing crossover with their daily identity. The network path from the Cloud PAW to resources can be tightly controlled – e.g. the Cloud PC might reside in an isolated Azure virtual network segment that only has routes to Microsoft management endpoints or specific servers, and nowhere else. An example from the field: an admin’s Cloud PAW was set up on its own Azure vNet with no connectivity to the main corporate network or internet, effectively acting as a secure jump box for cloud admin only . The remote session protocol (whether RDP or the Windows 365 streaming client) can be configured not to allow clipboard, drive mapping, or file transfer back to the host device, truly isolating the environments. And since Microsoft hosts these VMs, solutions like Azure Bastion or just-in-time start/stop can be used to reduce exposure, one practitioner noted using auto-shutdown and start-on-connect for their AVD VM so it’s offline when not in use, cutting cost and attack exposure.

The user experience with a virtual PAW is generally considered superior to carrying a second physical laptop. It’s faster to switch contexts (just alt-tab into a remote desktop window, versus physically swapping machines or KVMs), and the performance can be tuned by choosing an appropriate VM SKU. There’s also an element of scalability and business continuity: if an admin’s laptop dies, they can borrow any corporate device, log into their Cloud PC from it, and still carry out critical admin tasks, the privileged workspace isn’t tied to one piece of hardware. This addresses one of NCSC’s principles about scaling the solution and maintaining trust: the secure workstation concept can adapt to user needs and environment changes, as long as the principles (isolation, hardening, monitoring) are maintained.

It’s worth noting that even NCSC’s guidance hints at virtualisation as a tool in the PAW strategy. For example, if certain high-risk software must be run, they suggest “isolat[ing] these actions from the privileged access workstation through virtualisation”. Many organisations interpret this to mean running a risky app in a virtual machine on the PAW, but it can just as well endorse the idea of the PAW itself being a virtual instance separated from the primary device. In any case, the concept is gaining acceptance. Industry experts have started referring to this approach as a “virtual PAW” or “vPAW.” As one Microsoft cloud security evangelist put it: “We can start using Windows 365 as PAW computers… Lock them down using Conditional Access and Intune management, [and] it will also work for administrating other online services.” Another professional observed that if you don’t want to carry a 2nd device, “seriously consider Windows 365 and/or AVD. This ensures you have a separate ‘device’ for the dedicated privileged account, keeping your privileged access and your everyday access completely separate.” This approach aligns with Microsoft’s own recommendations to enforce separation of roles but leverages modern cloud tech to do so. It also dovetails with Entra Privileged Identity Management (PIM) nicely e.g. an admin can RDP into their Cloud PAW, activate a privileged role just-in-time via PIM, do the work, then sign out. The PAW VM could even be deprovisioned or reverted to a known snapshot periodically to ensure a clean state.

Of course, virtual PAWs are not without considerations. They rely on the security of the underlying platform and the connection. If the admin’s local device is heavily compromised (say with a keylogger or remote control malware), there is a chance that even the remote session could be observed or tampered with. The RDP client could potentially be manipulated or the user’s credentials for logging into the Cloud PC stolen (though using strong authentication like smartcards or FIDO2 keys can mitigate credential theft). Additionally, there’s a need to protect the cloud VM itself, it should have proper guardrails (no internet or email, as discussed, and continuous monitoring). Fortunately, because it’s Intune-managed and Defender-monitored, any aberrant activity on the Cloud PAW can generate alerts just like on a physical PAW. And importantly, if something ever does go wrong with the Cloud PAW (indicators of compromise, etc.), it can be reset or rebuilt quickly, since it’s effectively software-defined. This agility is a big advantage over a physical machine rebuild process.

Comparing the Approaches and Best Practice Alignment

Each approach; physical PAW, Zero Trust on a single device, or virtual PAW can be viable, but they offer different balances of security vs. convenience. Here’s a quick comparison of key points, framed by best practices from NCSC and Microsoft:

• Attack Surface & Isolation: A traditional dedicated PAW (especially offline or on a separate network) offers the smallest attack surface, it’s purpose-built to do one type of task and nothing else, minimising what an attacker can latch onto. A virtual PAW (Cloud PC/AVD) comes very close to this ideal, since it too can be confined to only admin tasks and is logically separated from the user’s daily environment. A well-configured virtual PAW will not have your email, Teams chat, or random web access available, so the chances of it getting phished or drive-by infected are extremely low (just like a physical PAW). By contrast, the Zero Trust single-device approach has a larger attack surface simply because that device is doing double-duty; the admin might be reading email one minute and connecting to Entra ID admin center the next. That said, its attack surface is still significantly reduced compared to an unmanaged or open device, because robust policies (Intune baselines, up-to-date patches, no local admin, etc.) and network segmentation limit what can execute and where it can connect. It’s a bit of a middle ground: more exposure than a dedicated PAW, but far less than a typical user laptop.

• Usability and Productivity: On this front, using a single device for everything obviously wins for simplicity, admins don’t have to switch context at all. But the virtual PAW isn’t far behind: launching a remote desktop session to your Cloud PC is relatively frictionless, and it spares you from carrying extra hardware or maintaining multiple physical devices. Many admins find this a very acceptable trade-off, as evidenced by the growing adoption of Cloud PC/AVD for privileged access. The physical PAW is the most burdensome, it’s effective, but as NCSC notes, if it’s not designed with usability in mind, users might resist it. The goal of any modern solution should be to blend security into the workflow as seamlessly as possible. Virtual PAWs and intelligent CA policies help achieve that by automating the enforcement (the admin doesn’t have to remember where to log in; if they try from the wrong place, it’s just blocked) and by leveraging tools they are already comfortable with (a Windows desktop, just delivered via cloud).

• Enforcement of Clean Source Principle: If we rank strictly by the purity of this principle, physical and virtual PAWs tie for first, both provide a clean, isolated platform from which to launch privileged operations. The cloud-based PAW, when used properly, keeps the privileged session entirely separate from the user’s standard computing context, which is exactly what clean source demands. The Zero Trust approach on a single device somewhat violates the letter of this principle (since the source isn’t exclusive), but tries to uphold the spirit by ensuring the device is as secure as possible at the moment of admin access. It’s a bit like saying “we trust this source because it meets all our criteria right now” which is good, but not as foolproof as “we trust this source because it does nothing else at all.”

• Reducing Risk of Compromise: All approaches assume a breach can still happen and emphasize containment. Traditional PAWs reduce risk by elimination of vectors (no email, no web). Virtual PAWs do the same, and add the ability to rapidly reset the environment if needed. A compromised physical PAW is a nightmare scenario (because it implies your most secure device failed), and you’d have to reimage or replace it. A compromised Cloud PAW can be redeployed fresh in a short time, and forensic data from Defender could help investigate how it happened. The single-device approach banks on strong EDR (endpoint detection & response) to catch any attack attempts on the device and on microsegmentation to limit where malware could go. Microsoft’s guidance is clear that any intermediary or device in the privileged access chain should have EDR active and feeding signals into Conditional Access, so that if something looks wrong, the device can be marked non-compliant and cut off  . In an ideal state, even if an admin’s primary laptop were compromised, Defender for Endpoint might detect the threat and auto-quarantine the machine or switch it to “risky” before the attacker can actually abuse the admin access thereby failing safe. This is a great goal, but it relies on very fast detection, which can’t be 100% guaranteed.

• Alignment with NCSC/Microsoft Best Practices: Both NCSC and Microsoft advocate a layered approach to secure privileged access. They recommend dedicated secure devices, but also emphasise broader controls like strict account segregation, MFA, just-in-time access, monitoring of admin sessions, and controlling what goes in/out of the admin environment (no data exfil via that path). A modern solution is expected to combine these. For example, Microsoft Entra Privileged Identity Management (PIM) can be used alongside any of the device approaches to ensure admin roles are not active 24x7, limiting standing privilege. Similarly, Session monitoring (like capturing logs of admin actions or even full session recording using third-party PAM tools) can add oversight. The virtual PAW approach is very much in harmony with these best practices: it keeps the device dedicated (satisfying the device isolation principle), but also leverages Conditional Access (a recommended control) and can enforce auditable, centralised management via Intune (which NCSC would view as establishing that “single source of truth” and unified standard for configurations across your PAW solution). The Zero Trust single-device approach aligns with the direction of travel (Zero Trust is heavily championed by both NCSC and Microsoft), but one could argue it slightly deviates from the specific recommendation of a separate device. NCSC’s recent guidance basically says: use PAWs for high-risk access, but also design your solution to fit your threat model and don’t make it unusable. If your organisation’s risk tolerance is such that a hardened single device with strong policies is deemed acceptable for certain admin scenarios, that can be your implementation of the principle, though few would argue against still having a truly separate environment for the absolute most powerful accounts (like Global Admin or domain Enterprise Admin).

In summary, corporate-managed Windows environments today have more options than ever to secure privileged access. A company might choose a combination: for instance, everyday IT admins use Cloud PCs as their PAWs for Azure/M365 admin, while datacenter admins who need RDP into servers use a mix of AVD jump boxes and physical PAWs when on-site. Meanwhile, Conditional Access and ZTNA network controls enforce that only those approved methods can reach the admin interfaces, providing peace of mind that no one is quietly managing your cloud from an untrusted device.

Conclusion

Traditional Privileged Access Workstations remain a gold-standard for protecting administrative access, nothing beats a completely isolated, well-hardened device when it comes to reducing risk. But requiring a physical second machine for every admin is often at odds with the agile, cloud-centric world we now live in. Fortunately, modern alternatives have matured to address this gap. By leveraging cloud-hosted virtual PAWs (Windows 365 Cloud PCs or Azure Virtual Desktops) and zero trust enforcement mechanisms, organisations can achieve a robust privileged access environment that is both secure and user-friendly. In a scenario where all endpoints are corporate-managed and under tight compliance controls, these approaches are not only viable but increasingly common.

Using a Windows 365 or AVD as a PAW gives you the best of both worlds: a dedicated clean environment for admin tasks, delivered on-demand from the cloud. Admins benefit from not having to carry extra hardware, and IT teams can deploy or update these virtual PAWs at scale with ease. Integration with Microsoft’s security ecosystem ensures that device health, identity, and access policies work in tandem from Intune locking down the VM, to Defender for Endpoint watching for threats, to Conditional Access gating all admin sign-ins . The micro-segmentation/Zero Trust approach adds another strong layer, especially useful in fully cloud or hybrid environments: it ensures that even if no separate device is used, the pathway to administer critical systems is heavily guarded and context-aware. Only known-good users on known-good devices can get through, and should conditions change (say a device falls out of compliance or an account shows suspicious activity), the Zero Trust model responds by cutting off access, even mid-session if necessary.

For organisations worried about aligning with industry best practices, it’s clear that usability and security must go hand in hand. The NCSC’s principles for PAWs highlight that a solution will only be effective if it’s actually adopted, meaning it must enable admins to do their jobs efficiently while transparently baking in security. Modern solutions like virtual PAWs and conditional access policies embody this philosophy: they aim to secure the admin, not slow them down. Microsoft’s guidance reiterates that a successful privileged access strategy is end-to-end, combining secure devices, secure identities, and secure interfaces. We now have the tools to implement all of these in a cloud-managed, scalable way.

In closing, if your enterprise has already invested in Intune-managed Windows devices, you are well positioned to evolve beyond the classic PAW model. You can enforce the same “clean source” ideals through technology like Windows 365 and rigorous Conditional Access without making admins carry a literal clean-sourced laptop. It’s about adapting the principle to the times: the clean source might be a cloud PC now, and the “air gap” might be a logical one enforced by software. Done correctly, these modern alternatives can reduce the attack surface nearly as effectively as a traditional PAW, while greatly increasing flexibility and acceptance among your teams. Just remember that no single control is a panacea; even with fancy cloud PAWs or Zero Trust portals, disciplined operational practices (like separate admin accounts, least privilege, MFA, and monitoring of admin activities) remain crucial. By combining these approaches, organisations can confidently secure their Microsoft cloud administration paths without dragging productivity back to the 1990s. It’s a win-win for security teams and admins alike: high privilege access that’s both safer and smoother. 

Sources: The analysis above incorporates guidance from Microsoft’s security documentation on privileged access devices and intermediaries, NCSC’s published principles for secure PAWs, as well as insights from industry professionals who have implemented virtual PAWs in real-world environments. These sources underscore the importance of balancing strong technical controls with practical usability in modern privileged access solutions.