Privileged Access Workstations for Cloud Admins: Old Hat or Modern Necessity?

Peter Cashen
Oct 7
19 min read

Imagine this: You’re an IT administrator logging into the Azure portal from your everyday laptop. Unbeknownst to you, a piece of malware from a phishing email is lurking on that same device, ready to steal your credentials or session tokens. It’s a nightmare scenario and exactly the kind of risk a Privileged Access Workstation (PAW) is designed to prevent. In an age where one compromised Microsoft 365 or Azure admin account can spell disaster, many organisations are revisiting the idea of using separate, highly secure machines for cloud administration. Are dedicated admin workstations still relevant amid today’s cloud-centric, zero-trust security models? Let’s explore the pros, cons, and current best practices, drawing on guidance from the UK’s National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) and Microsoft.

Then vs. Now: A Decade of Evolving Admin Security

Ten years ago, the concept of a separate admin-only computer was gaining traction as a way to protect “Tier 0” assets like domain controllers and enterprise admins. Back then, IT environments were largely on-premises, and threats often came from malware that could pivot from a compromised user PC to higher privileges. The solution was to isolate administrative tasks onto a locked-down machine, physically separated from everyday browsing and email. NCSC even labeled the practice of administering a high-trust system from a less-trusted device as the “browsing-up” anti-pattern, essentially pointing out that the admin’s computer can become “the weakest link” if it isn’t as secure as the systems it manages . The recommended approach was “browsing-down”: keep admin devices clean by avoiding web surfing, email, or other risky activities on them . This principle was baked into many organisations’ security architectures a decade ago.

Fast-forward to today, and the IT landscape has transformed. Administrators now manage sprawling cloud services via web portals and remote tools accessible from anywhere. Modern security has also evolved: we have ubiquitous multi-factor authentication (MFA), better endpoint detection, and Zero Trust models that verify devices and users continuously. At the same time, attackers have adapted with new tricks. For instance, adversaries use Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) phishing to hijack session cookies and bypass MFA entirely . They distribute infostealer malware that can quietly harvest tokens and credentials from an infected device. Remote work is common, meaning admins might not always be on a corporate LAN, their endpoint’s security is often the last line of defence. In this context, the question arises: does the old PAW approach still make sense? According to both NCSC and Microsoft, yes, more than ever, if applied thoughtfully. But it’s worth examining how the concept has been updated for the cloud era.

What is a PAW? The “Clean Source” Principle and Browse-Down Basics

A Privileged Access Workstation (PAW) is essentially a dedicated, hardened device used exclusively for sensitive administration. In simple terms, a PAW reduces compromise risk by separating admin work from day-to-day use and by enforcing hardened security features on a device dedicated to privileged accounts . The idea is that any account with elevated privileges (Global Administrator, Exchange Online Admin, Azure subscription owner, etc.) is only ever used on a highly trusted machine; one that an organisation tightly controls and keeps free of the usual dangers of general computing.

The NCSC encapsulates this with their “browse down, not up” guidance. Browsing-up, using a low-trust device to perform high-trust admin tasks, is a big no-no in their book . Why? Because if that less-trusted device is compromised, an attacker effectively “inherits” all the powerful access of the admin who uses it . In contrast, browsing-down means your admin workstation is as trusted as (or more than) the systems it manages. Practically, that means no checking email, no random web surfing, no opening unvetted attachments on your PAW. Those high-risk activities should be isolated in another context entirely, so your admin machine stays clean .

NCSC Anti-Pattern Warning: “The first anti-pattern is ‘browsing-up’ for administration… Essentially, the administrator computer is the weakest link. A better approach is ‘browsing-down’, keeping administration computers clean by using safeguards such as not browsing the web or opening email attachments.”

NCSC’s latest guidance (as of 2025) doubles down on this philosophy. They describe a PAW as a “trusted physical user device designed to protect high-risk accesses from compromise” . Its primary goal is to minimize the device’s attack surface, increasing the difficulty for an attacker to compromise it . Ideally, a PAW “should not be directly exposed to high-risk functions that could jeopardize its integrity. However, if access to these functions is necessary, such as for email or web browsing, it should occur in a carefully constrained manner.” In other words, even if an admin sometimes must “browse down” to do something like read documentation or vendor emails, this should be done via isolation (for example, using a sandbox, a virtual machine, or another segregated context) so the PAW itself remains unharmed.

To paint a clearer picture, here are typical characteristics of a modern PAW:

Minimal software footprint: Only admin and management tools are installed. No Office email client, no Teams or Slack, no casual web plugins. This reduces avenues for attack .
Network restrictions: The workstation is configured to only reach known administrative portals and services, for example, Entra ID, Microsoft 365 admin center, Azure management endpoints, and other SaaS management interfaces. All other internet access is blocked or highly restricted (default deny). Crucially, “general web browsing” on arbitrary sites is disallowed. Accessing a Microsoft 365 admin website in a browser is fine; accessing a random new URL is not, unless explicitly approved.
Application control and hardening: Strict policies like AppLocker or Windows Defender Application Control (WDAC) allow only approved executables and scripts to run. The OS is hardened with features such as BitLocker encryption, Secure Boot, virtualization-based security (HVCI), Credential Guard, attack surface reduction rules, etc. The device has no standing local admin rights; even local admin tasks are just-in-time and audited .
Endpoint protection and monitoring: The PAW is typically under intense security monitoring, for example, an EDR (Endpoint Detection & Response) solution like Microsoft Defender for Endpoint is running in high gear, with tamper protection and cloud-based blocking enabled. Logging is comprehensive. Unusual activity on a PAW (like a blocked outbound connection or a new process) is treated with high priority by security teams.

By enforcing that privileged logins only happen from these fortified devices, an organisation essentially implements what Microsoft calls the “clean source principle” ensuring the source of administrative activity is trustworthy. Microsoft’s guidance reinforces that no matter how many layers of security you put around your cloud admins (MFA, conditional access, privileged identity management), if the device they use is owned by an attacker, all bets are off. A clean, isolated workstation is the foundation.

Modern Threat Landscape: Why PAWs Still Matter in 2025

One might argue that with modern defences like MFA and conditional access, the risk of admin account compromise is lower than it was 10 years ago. Unfortunately, recent attacks show that determined threat actors can still target privileged users quite effectively and the fallout can be severe.

Credential Theft & Phishing Remain Top Threats: Verizon’s data breach investigations and countless incident reports continue to find that stolen credentials are a leading cause of breaches. Attackers frequently start with phishing emails or social engineering to get an initial foothold. For cloud administrators, this often means trying to trick an admin into entering their credentials on a fake login page or executing malware on their machine. In fact, Microsoft has observed attackers using advanced AiTM phishing kits that set up a proxy website to the real login, duping users into entering their username, password, and even MFA code then stealing the resulting session cookie to hijack the authenticated session. This method bypasses even strong MFA because the attacker rides in on the valid session token. If a global admin unwittingly falls for such a lure on a regular workstation, the attacker can silently log in to the tenant as that admin. A properly locked-down PAW helps here by reducing exposure, that admin is far less likely to be reading random emails or clicking unknown links on their secured workstation in the first place. Additionally, organisations can complement MFA with device-based conditional access rules (for example, only allow admin portal access from compliant PAW devices) to make a stolen token less useful . It’s an illustration of how identity security and device security go hand-in-hand.
Session Hijacking and Malware: Even outside of phishing, commodity malware is a danger. Consider info-stealer malware (like RedLine or Raccoon stealer) that infects a PC, it can scrape browser cookies, saved passwords, and even authentication tokens. If an admin has been logging into Azure or PowerShell from their everyday PC, these malicious tools can potentially grab the keys to the kingdom. By contrast, on a PAW with no general web access, the odds of getting hit by such malware drop dramatically. As the NCSC puts it, a dedicated PAW is one of the most effective tools for defending administrators from common attacks like credential theft and malware infection. They explicitly “recommend you always use a PAW for high-risk access to a cloud service handling sensitive data.”
Privileged Access = High-Impact Breaches: The reason all this matters is the outsized impact a compromised admin account can have. NCSC’s cloud security advice notes that the very same actions administrators perform in managing a cloud service (creating accounts, changing configs, disabling controls) are “the same activities that attackers also take after initial compromise… making accurate detection of malicious admin access much more difficult”, which is why preventing that compromise in the first place is so important . We’ve seen real-world examples of how devastating an admin breach can be. In one recent incident analysis, a ransomware group dubbed Storm-0501 shifted to cloud-based attacks, they compromised credentials for an Entra ID Global Administrator account and were able to escalate privileges, exfiltrate data, and even delete cloud backups, all without needing traditional malware on the victim’s network. Once they had the keys to the cloud, they leveraged legitimate admin tools against the infrastructure. It’s a stark reminder that if attackers get hold of your admin accounts, they can leverage the full power and access those accounts grant, whether on-prem or in the cloud. A PAW, combined with strong identity safeguards, aims to keep those keys out of attackers’ hands to begin with.
Remote Work and BYOD Challenges: In 2015, admins were often working on corporate desktop machines in the office. Now, many work from laptops that travel or even from home setups. Some organisations allow BYOD for convenience. This makes the case for PAWs stronger: if you can’t vouch for the security of wherever an admin might log in, giving them a company-managed, tightly controlled admin workstation (or virtual desktop) ensures that whenever they perform privileged tasks, they’re doing so from a known secure environment. In technical terms, Microsoft encourages using device compliance and identity checks such that only a device meeting your security standards can perform privileged operations . For example, Entra ID Conditional Access can be configured with a policy filter so that only machines tagged or registered as “PAW” can access admin portals. This effectively enforces that your cloud admins must use their PAW (since any other device would be blocked), adding an extra layer of protection even if credentials are phished.

To sum up, modern attacks haven’t rendered PAWs obsolete, if anything, they underline why having a “secure keyboard” behind your admin accounts is vital. As Microsoft’s security team often reminds us: an attacker who owns the admin’s device effectively owns the admin’s identity, despite all other defences. The PAW is about keeping that device out of attackers’ reach.

Benefits of a Separate Privileged Workstation

Given the threats above, what concrete advantages do PAWs offer in today’s context? Here are some key pros for using a dedicated admin workstation for Azure/M365 admins:

Greatly Reduced Attack Surface: By removing everyday applications and internet access, a PAW dramatically shrinks the avenues through which malware or phishing can reach an admin account. No email client means no risky attachments to accidentally run. No open web browsing means drive-by download attacks or watering-hole sites are off the table. As NCSC highlights, keeping the admin computer “clean” (no web, no email) makes it much harder for an attacker to even get a foothold . In effect, the PAW operates in a bubble where the usual traps simply aren’t present.
Protection of Privileged Credentials: Admin credentials (passwords, tokens, certificates) never reside on a less-secure machine, which helps prevent theft. Even if an attacker somehow phished an admin’s password, they would also need access to the PAW device (or a way around its controls) to actually use those credentials. This raises the bar significantly for attackers. As one expert put it, by funneling all admin sign-ins through a known hardened device, an attacker now needs both valid credentials and physical or managed access to that device to impersonate you . It’s a form of two-factor protection: “something you know” (the credential) and “something you have” (the secure workstation). Moreover, organisations can enforce this by policy. For example, if a Global Admin tries to log in from an untrusted laptop, conditional access will deny it even if the password or token is correct . This synergy of device trust and identity is a cornerstone of Zero Trust security .
Strong Device Hardening and Monitoring: A PAW isn’t just a vanilla OS with a few restrictions; it’s usually equipped with a stack of advanced security controls that would be impractical on a general-purpose PC. Think application allow-listing, strict device configuration, and real-time monitoring. On a normal user’s laptop, enabling something like WDAC or full application whitelisting might break productivity apps or be too restrictive. But on a PAW, it’s feasible, admins only need a small set of tools, and the lockdown can be extreme without stopping them from doing their job. These devices often run with higher scrutiny: security teams know that if anything suspicious happens on a PAW, it could be a sign of a serious intrusion, so they log and alert accordingly. NCSC’s new PAW principles explicitly call for protective monitoring and controlling what data goes in and out of the PAW environment. This means if an attacker somehow tried to exfiltrate data or introduce malware via a PAW, the chances of detection are much higher. The hardened build of a PAW also mitigates the impact of an attack; for instance, even if an admin accidentally launches a malicious script, application control or device guard policies might outright block it from executing on a well-configured PAW.
Alignment with Best Practices and Compliance: Using PAWs demonstrates a proactive security posture that auditors and frameworks often love to see. Government guidance is increasingly explicit about these practices. We’ve mentioned NCSC’s stance, they’ve even published eight principles for secure PAWs to guide organisations in implementing them effectively. Many industry standards (from financial regulations to government security baselines) either mandate or strongly recommend isolating administrative tasks. Following such guidance can not only improve security but also satisfy compliance requirements in certain sectors. It shows leadership that the IT team is taking least privilege and defence in depth seriously, beyond just technical controls.
Damage Limitation and Peace of Mind: If the worst happens and an admin account is compromised, having it constrained to a PAW can limit the blast radius. For example, since a PAW doesn’t normally have direct internet access or email, an attacker who stealthily got onto a PAW might have a harder time exfiltrating data or communicating with their command-and-control infrastructure. There’s also a psychological benefit: administrators using a PAW tend to be more mindful that they are in a sensitive environment. It’s a dedicated context where they know, “I’m in admin mode now.” This can encourage more cautious behavior (like double-checking a PowerShell script before running it). Meanwhile, CIOs and CISOs gain peace of mind knowing that critical changes, say, altering security settings in Entra ID or accessing sensitive customer data in Exchange Online are only done from locked-down, monitored devices, not from someone’s coffee shop laptop. In many ways, a PAW is an insurance policy: it cuts off many of the common paths attackers use, thereby significantly reducing the likelihood of a breach of high-privilege accounts.

Challenges and Trade-offs

It’s not all sunshine and rainbows with Privileged Access Workstations. Like any security control, PAWs introduce some challenges and downsides that organisations must consider:

Usability and Productivity Friction: Let’s face it, working on a PAW can be less convenient than using a full-featured standard workstation. By design, you can’t check your email, you can’t quickly Google an error message, you might not even be able to copy-paste from a website if the site isn’t on the approved list. Administrators often end up juggling two devices or environments: their PAW for admin tasks, and a separate machine (or VM) for regular work like attending meetings, reading documentation, or communication. This context-switching can slow down workflows. For example, if an admin needs to download a troubleshooting tool or script from the internet, on a PAW they might have to go to another machine to get it, then transfer it through a secure mechanism (scanned USB, sanctioned file share, etc.) into the PAW whereas on a normal PC, they’d just download it directly. Such hurdles can be seen as “red tape” by busy IT staff.
Risk of Workarounds and Non-Compliance: The biggest danger of a PAW program that doesn’t account for user experience is that admins might try to sidestep it out of frustration or convenience. If a PAW is so locked down that admins feel they can’t do their jobs efficiently, they may resort to using their regular workstation for a quick change “just this once,” or they might pressure IT to relax the rules. NCSC explicitly warns about this in their principles, noting that while PAWs are inherently restrictive, they “must also serve as enabling technologies” for admins. They should have the tools admins need to work efficiently, reducing the likelihood of users seeking less secure alternatives. In practice, this means designing the PAW solution with input from administrators themselves. For instance, if admins frequently need web access to vendor sites or knowledge bases, the organisation might provide a safe method for that (such as a one-way browser VM or a “mirror” browser that can fetch content and sanitise it). Failure to do so can result in shadow practices that undermine the whole point of a PAW. In short, a PAW that isn’t usable won’t be used, at least not all the time, which can be worse than not having one at all, because it breeds a false sense of security.
Operational and Deployment Overhead: Introducing PAWs means more devices (or at least more VMs) to manage and maintain. This can strain IT operations if not automated. Each PAW needs secure provisioning (ideally from a known-good state), regular patching, software updates, health monitoring, and periodic security audits to ensure it hasn’t drifted from the hardened baseline. Microsoft has tried to ease this by providing templates and automated build processes (for example, deploying PAWs with Intune and Windows Autopilot is a common approach). Nonetheless, it’s an investment of time and effort. You need policies for how admins get their PAW (Is it a physical separate laptop they carry? A virtual desktop they remote into?), how to handle emergency admin needs if a PAW is not at hand, and what to do if a PAW is lost or broken. These are solvable issues, but not trivial. There’s also the matter of supporting infrastructure, as NCSC notes, a PAW is only as effective as the environment around it . For example, if your PAWs rely on a central management server or jump host, that infrastructure must be secured to the same level, or it could become a weak link. All this adds complexity, which some smaller organisations might struggle with (though they likely have fewer admins to worry about too).
Not a Silver Bullet: While PAWs reduce many risks, they don’t eliminate all threats to administrators. It’s possible for an attacker to target the allowed channels on a PAW. For instance, a cloud admin still needs to access the internet to reach Azure or Microsoft 365 so if there were a vulnerability in the Azure Portal or a sophisticated supply-chain attack on an admin tool, a PAW wouldn’t magically stop it. (These scenarios are less common, but not impossible.) Similarly, if an admin on a PAW is tricked into downloading what they think is a safe PowerShell module from an official source, and it turns out malicious, the PAW might not prevent that if it’s within the scope of “allowed” activity. In short, PAW is not an excuse to ignore other best practices: you still need robust identity security, up-to-date software, and vigilant user education. Furthermore, a PAW can create a false sense of invincibility, an admin might be less careful with links when on their regular machine (“I only use my PAW for admin, so clicking this on my regular PC can’t harm our servers”… until that leads to a stolen credential). Organisations should maintain a holistic security mindset. PAWs help a lot but must be part of a broader strategy including strong authentication, principle of least privilege, Privileged Identity Management (just-in-time access), and continuous monitoring.
User Buy-In and Culture: Introducing PAWs may require a culture shift, especially for veteran admins who are used to having full control of their devices. There can be initial resistance: “Why do I need a separate laptop just to do my job? This feels like overkill.” It’s important to communicate the “why” to privileged users. Often, showing examples of breaches and near-misses helps drive the point home. For instance, you might highlight how an admin at another company got phished and the attackers used that foothold to ransom the entire cloud environment, and how using a PAW with strict controls could have broken that kill chain. When admins understand that the PAW isn’t about hindering them but about protecting the whole organisation (including their own account), they are more likely to embrace it. Some organisations incentivise the use of PAWs by making them as seamless as possible, e.g., fast login, pre-installed tools, maybe even slightly higher-end hardware since it’s a “security device”. This softens the blow of the restrictions.

Current Guidance: NCSC and Microsoft Perspectives

Both the NCSC and Microsoft have been updating their guidance to reflect the realities of cloud administration, and both consistently advocate for secure admin workstations – with some nuances.

NCSC’s Eight Principles for PAWs (2023–2025): In recent guidance, the UK NCSC published a comprehensive set of eight principles to help organisations design and deploy PAWs effectively. These principles cover everything from strategy and scope (identifying which accounts/systems truly need a PAW) to technical build (establishing a strong foundation of trust on the device, reducing its attack surface, etc.) to operational considerations (scaling the solution, monitoring it, controlling data flows). A key theme is making the PAW both secure and usable. NCSC experts note that PAWs “should equip users with the necessary tools to perform their tasks efficiently, reducing the chances of individuals resorting to insecure workarounds”. They also emphasise that a PAW is not a standalone silver bullet but “just one component of the broader set of controls” needed to defend against threats. For example, a PAW complements privileged access management (PAM) processes, but doesn’t replace the need for things like MFA, logging, and least privilege. Another interesting point: NCSC’s guidance acknowledges that one size doesn’t fit all. Organisations should tailor their PAW strategy to their specific risks and needs. If a certain admin role has truly high-risk access (say a Global Admin for a tenant with sensitive data), that warrants a full PAW setup. On the other hand, not every IT role in the company needs to be tied to a separate workstation, it’s about proportionality. “You probably don’t need to be using PAWs and tiered administration for the service that manages your tea club rota,” the NCSC quips, “but for your sensitive systems… make sure [your] cloud estate isn’t undermined by poor admin security.” . In practice, this means identifying which accounts are most critical and applying PAW controls there first.
Microsoft’s Evolving PAW Guidance: Microsoft has long promoted the concept of “Secure Admin Workstations (SAWs)” or PAWs, especially since the days of on-prem Active Directory attacks. About 8–10 years ago, Microsoft’s recommended model was the Enhanced Security Admin Environment (ESAE) or “Red Forest”, which included a separate admin forest and dedicated machines for admins. That model has since evolved. Today, Microsoft’s approach, often discussed under Zero Trust and privileged access strategy, integrates PAWs as part of a holistic solution. Microsoft documentation stresses the clean source principle (only perform privileged operations from secure devices) and provides reference architectures for tiered administrative accounts and devices. The modern Microsoft PAW deployment often uses Entra ID joined devices, managed by Intune, with compliance policies and conditional access to enforce that only those devices can reach admin endpoints. They leverage Windows features (TPM, Secure Boot, virtualization-based security) to harden the device from the ground up. One Microsoft article notes that end-to-end privileged access security “requires a strong foundation of device security” because an attacker with control of the device can undermine virtually all other controls. Microsoft also differentiates between levels of user workstations, from standard enterprise builds to locked-down specialist builds, with the privileged level being the most locked-down and having the most restrictions (like no default internet access). They encourage organisations to use Conditional Access policies to ensure only trusted PAWs can perform privileged actions in Azure, Microsoft 365, and other admin portals. Additionally, Microsoft provides tooling to make PAW deployment easier. For instance, you can use Windows Autopilot with Intune to provision a new laptop directly into a privileged state with all the required hardening, eliminating the need to manually image and configure it. Microsoft’s security blogs frequently highlight attacks where device compromise led to tenant compromise, reinforcing their stance that securing the admin’s device is a critical part of cloud defence in depth .

In summary, both NCSC and Microsoft guidance in 2025 strongly endorse the use of PAWs for high-privilege roles, but they also provide nuance: implement it in a way that fits your organisation, don’t neglect usability, and integrate it with other controls like PAM and monitoring. The conversation has shifted from “Should we bother with PAWs?” to “How can we make PAWs work effectively in our modern environment?”.

Conclusion: Striking a Balance Between Security and Practicality

The core idea behind Privileged Access Workstations; isolating sensitive admin activities to reduce risk, has stood the test of time. In fact, in today’s cloud-driven world of advanced phishing, token theft, and ever-expanding admin portals, that idea is arguably more critical than ever for truly privileged accounts. A decade of security evolution hasn’t eliminated the need for PAWs; it has refined how we implement them. Modern PAW strategies use cloud management, policy-based access, and hardware security features to achieve the same goal as before: keep the admins (and by extension, the entire organisation) safe from a single endpoint compromise.

That said, the operational realities can’t be ignored. A PAW will introduce some inconvenience, and it’s not appropriate for every single IT person or system. The key is to apply it where it makes sense, typically for those administering the crown jewels (whether that’s your Entra ID tenant, your production cloud infrastructure, or other critical SaaS platforms). Lower-risk admin tasks might be handled with lighter measures. Think of PAWs as a high-security vault: not everything you protect needs to go in the vault, but your most valuable assets certainly do.

For cybersecurity professionals and IT architects, the task is to modernise the PAW concept for your environment. That might involve using virtualisation (for example, giving admins a virtual “disposable” environment for email or browsing, attached to their PAW), leveraging identity solutions (like requiring a specific device identity for admin logins), and continuously gathering feedback from administrators on what they need to do their jobs effectively within the security constraints. It’s a balancing act between lockdown and usability. The good news is, current guidance explicitly acknowledges this balance you’re not on your own to figure it out.

For business and technology leaders, the decision to implement PAWs should be guided by risk appetite and impact. The cost in convenience is real, but consider the cost of a breach where an attacker runs rampant with a global admin account, business email compromised, data exfiltrated or wiped, customers and regulators up in arms. Those headlines increasingly feature stories where a single compromised credential led to wide-ranging damage. A PAW is about preventing your organisation from becoming the next cautionary tale. As one NCSC piece put it, make sure all the hard work you invest in securing your cloud services “isn’t undermined by poor admin security”. It’s a simple message: guard the guards, protect the administrators.

In conclusion, Privileged Access Workstations remain a relevant and often essential component of a robust cloud security strategy in 2025. They are not a silver bullet, nor are they trivial to implement, but when done right, they significantly raise the hurdles for attackers and provide confidence that your critical admin actions are taking place in a safe, controlled environment. The threats of today may be more sophisticated than those of ten years ago, but so are the tools at our disposal to counter them. A PAW, implemented with modern best practices, exemplifies the “trust but verify” approach: trust the admin to do what’s needed, but verify they’re doing it from a secure box. For many organisations, that can make all the difference between a thwarted phishing attempt and a full-blown cloud breach.

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